This article reconciles theoretical and methodological differences between the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project and Bratton and van de Walle's 1997 analysis of democratic transitions occurring between 1990 and 1994. Analyses based on MAR have shown that protest in the 1980s was more likely to occur in more democratic African countries, whereas violent rebellion was more likely to occur in more autocratic countries. Bratton and van de Walle have shown that urban protests also occurred more frequently in more democratic countries. This article replicates earlier findings that prior democracy is an important variable for explaining ethnopolitical protest and rebellion. The authors analyze the relationship between such ethnopolitical action and democratic transitions and levels of democracy in 1994 and show that democracy and worker-student protest are mutually reinforcing, whereas democracy and rebellion are mutually incompatible. The authors further demonstrate that ethnopolitical protest is neutral in its consequences for democratization.
Minorities at Risk (MAR) project and Bratton and van de
analysis of democratic transitions between 1990 and 1994. These analyses differ in a number of ways, however, and this article seeks to reconcile these differences to provide a portrait of the interaction between democracy and ethnopolitical protest and rebellion in Africa over the approximately three decades between independence and the democratization wave of the 1990s. Analyses based on MAR have shown that (mostly nonviolent) protest in the 1980s was more likely to occur in more (although not fully) democratic African countries, whereas violent rebellion was more likely to occur as a last resort in more autocratic countries. Bratton and van de Walle have shown that urban protests by workers and students also occurred more frequently in more democratic countries and that such protests led to democratic transitions in the early 1990s. In this article, we replicate our earlier finding that prior democracy is an important variable for explaining ethnopolitical protest and rebellion, and we analyze the relationship between such ethnopolitical action and democratic transitions and levels of democracy in 1994. Can it be concluded that democracy and protest are mutually reinforcing, whereas democracy and rebellion are incompatible? We show that such a conclusion incorrectly assumes that the effects of ethnopolitical and worker-student protest are the same. We further demonstrate that ethnopolitical protest has neither the positive consequences for democratization that worker-student protest has nor the negative consequences that violent rebellion has. Figure 1 indicates the aspects of protest-democracy interaction that can be studied with available data.
We first replicate the central finding of our previous analysis of democracy's effects on ethnopolitical action using updated versions of the data sets on which it was based-MAR Phase III (899 update) and Polity III-to be sure that this finding was not data specific. We then explore the effects of past patterns of nonviolent protest and rebellion in combination with prior democracy on democratic transitions and levels of democracy. We do this first at the group level of analysis used in our replications and second at the more appropriate country level at which transitions occur. We then examine the combined effects of ethnopolitical action and the causal variables proposed by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) . 1 
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1. All of these data sets (Minorities at Risk [MAR] , Polity, and Bratton and van de Walle) are available from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at www.icpsr.umich.edu. The complete MAR dataset is also available at www.bsos.umd.edu/ cidcm/mar.
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THEORY AND OPERATIONALIZATION
In the MAR project, the cases are ethnopolitical groups-ethnic or communal minorities (either demographic or sociological) that have persistent identities and are in situations that place them at risk of experiencing violent conflict, human rights violations, and/or social injustice. Groups are considered to be at risk if they suffer (or, in the case of advantaged minorities, benefit from) systematic discriminatory treatment-economic or political-vis-à-vis other groups in the society or if they are the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of self-defined political, economic, or social interests. Such groups are ethnopolitical because they are defined by themselves and others as having a base in ethnic identity while being constantly molded by political interaction with other groups and the state, often centered on questions of economic distribution (Scarritt, 1986, p. 87) . Ethnopolitical protest (primarily nonviolent demonstrations and verbal opposition) and violent rebellion by such groups are the dependent variables, and the degree of democracy is treated as a contextual variable. The measurement of democracy is based on the Polity project, which has a political procedural conception of democracy, although not merely an electoral one. The operationalization of these concepts is described in Appendix A.
In our previous analysis of African minorities at risk based on MAR Phase I and Polity II data sets (Scarritt & McMillan, 1995) , nonviolent protest and violent rebellion by ethnic minorities in Africa in the 1980s were found to be best explained by a combination of previous political action of the same type and specific polity characteristics: democracy (for protest) or political competitiveness (for rebellion) in the immediate postindependence period. We indicated that a plausible interpretation of our findings is that protest in the anticolonial nationalist and immediate postindependence periods occurred more directly in response to grievances felt at those times and that this relationship was attenuated in the 1970s and 1980s by the dynamics of mobilization and repression. These dynamics motivated some groups to engage in continuous nonviolent protest and motivated others to engage in frequent rebellion. When grievances were not addressed after independence, leaders of each ethnic group began to mobilize their followers to raise the priority given to their group's grievances, usually at the expense of other groups. Most grievances remained wholly or partially unsatisfied because the conditions that gave rise to them did not change significantly; no group was able to attain all or even most of its goals in a situation of competitive mobilization, varying degrees of repression, and increasing economic decline. For most groups in states that had been relatively democratic since the 1960s, nonviolent protest-which occasionally turned violent-was stimulated by prior mobilization even when grievances were relatively low. Repression did not eliminate conflict but prevented it from taking other forms. In highly authoritarian states, some groups rebelled, seeking autonomy, independence, or fundamental change in group power, and were repressed. Repression, although it was often severe, could not end rebellion but limited its effectiveness as a vehicle for change in the status of minorities. This interpretation is supported by the fact that protest and rebellion in the 1960s were highly correlated with the same forms of political action in the 1980s for groups in both phases and is reinforced by the successful replication here of the crucial results with MAR Phase III and Polity III data as well as by the similar findings of Rothchild (1991 Rothchild ( , 1997 .
Little work has been done using ethnopolitical protest and rebellion to explain democratic transitions. But in a recent analysis (Scarritt & McMillan, 2000) , we find that prior democracy is positively associated but that ethnopolitical protest aggregated to the country level is, with some caveats, negatively associated with posttransition human rights provision. In another recent analysis that focuses primarily on the effects of democratization on ethnopolitical action from 1985 to 1998 (using MAR data), Gurr (2000) inferred, on the basis of the fact that one third of the groups in countries making only partial transitions engaged in rebellion, that "ethnopolitical conflict played a part in derailing or delaying democratic transitions" (p. 157). Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) analysis of democratic transitions in 42 African countries differs from MAR in that the cases are countries and protest during and immediately prior to the onset of transition and directed at political goals-mostly by students and workers-is aggregated to the country level. Such protest is assumed to have occurred because of the politicization of current economic grievances. Parallel to the findings based on the global and African MAR data, this type of protest in the late 1980s and early 1990s is found to be more positively affected by prior democracy than by any other variable except the number of trade unions in the country, although diffusion and structural adjustment programs are also important causes (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 151) . Protest, in turn, affects democratic transitions (the holding of a free and fair competitive election) in conjunction with overseas development assistance and characteristics of the transition process (the presence or absence of military intervention and the degree of opposition cohesion); it affects the level of democracy in 1994 (the end point of their analysis) in conjunction with prior democracy and the presence or absence of military intervention in the transition process. Thus, for Bratton and van de Walle, democratization in the early 1990s is the primary dependent variable, and protest and prior democracy are independent variables. Like the Polity project, they have a political procedural conception of democracy that is more than electoral because they define democratic elections as competitive and occurring in the context of civil liberties (pp. 9-13, 111-122, 140-147, 201-210) . The operationalization of their major relevant concepts is summarized in Appendix A.
THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY AND MOBILIZATION ON ETHNIC PROTEST AND REBELLION IN THE 1980s: REPLICATION OF PREVIOUS ANALYSIS
The attempt to fully replicate our earlier analysis encountered a number of problems that were due to changes in the MAR data set between Phase I and Phase III, so it is important to begin by laying out the similarities and differences between the two phases (Gurr, 1993a (Gurr, , 1996 .
The project identifies groups at the highest politically relevant level of aggregation within a country, ignoring objective primordial differences if necessary. It includes only countries with populations of at least 500,000 and groups whose population is at least either 100,000 or 1% of a country's population. Two hundred and twenty-seven minority groups, including 74 in Africa south of the Sahara, were identified by applying these criteria in Phase I. In Phase III, 23 African groups were dropped when they were no longer considered to be at risk, because discrimination or mobilization by or against them no longer existed. This appears to have been a tightening of criteria of inclusion from Phase I, in which mobilization of a substantial nature at any time since 1945 was considered to put a group at risk (Gurr, 1993a, p. 7) . Changed borders eliminated one additional group. Changed borders or new conflicts and mobilization efforts resulted in the addition of 17 new African groups. Thus, 276 minority groups, including 66 in Africa south of the Sahara, were identified in Phase III. There are 49 African groups that are included in both MAR phases. Given the difficulty of recoding groups from Phase I that were excluded from Phase III, we instead examine whether the key finding for Phase I can be replicated with Phase III data in the belief that replication in spite of changes in the data will demonstrate the strength and generality of this finding.
Among the categories of variables from the MAR Phase I data set that were included in our previous analysis were grievances, past mobilization for nonviolent protest and rebellion, current (1980s) nonviolent protest and rebellion, and democracy. MAR Phase III added a number of variables, eliminated a few, modified some, and recoded others. The most important change in terms of our analysis was that nonviolent and violent protest were collapsed into a single category of protest in the coding process (Gurr, 1996, pp. 75-76) .
Violent protest was not significantly related to any explanatory variables or highly correlated with nonviolent protest in global or African analyses of Phase I data (Gurr, 1993b, p. 168n; Scarritt & McMillan, 1995, p. 324) . Polity III updated Polity II to the 1990s and eliminated some coding errors.
This fundamental change in the coding of protest made strict replication of results that were generated using earlier data impossible, even for groups that were included in both data sets. For those groups, the new Phase III coding rules went into effect starting with the 1985 data, and one quarter of the cases were coded as missing protest for the 1980 to 1984 period. To construct a protest variable for the entire 1980 to 1989 period, we added Phase I nonviolent protest scores for the 1980 to 1984 period to the new Phase III scores for protest in the 1985 to 1989 period. Because the Phase I data were nearly complete with respect to protest, we recaptured 16 of the 17 lost cases, although at a cost of using slightly different variables for protest in the 1980s in the original analysis and the replication. The group scores with and without violent protest in the 1980 to 1989 period are not dramatically different because there were only nine cases of violent protest in that period. As would be expected, the replication more closely resembles the original analysis if these extraneous data for 1980 to 1984 are omitted.
Because the focus of this article is on the interaction between democracy and ethnopolitical action, we replicate only the portion of that analysis that is relevant to this relationship. In our previous analysis, the strength of various bivariate relationships was used to select which state characteristics would be included in multiple regression analyses of the determinants of political action in the 1980s-the more inclusive democracy variable in the case of nonviolent protest and the more specific competitiveness of participation in the case of rebellion (because democracy was not significantly related to rebellion). Competitiveness is one element in the calculation of democracy but, unlike its other components, is not highly correlated with it. It is intuitively plausible that the participatory element of democracy inhibits rebellion, whereas the combination of participatory and institutional elements supports protest. Multiple regression of nonviolent protest in the 1980s on mobilization for protest, grievances, and democracy (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) revealed that both democracy and mobilization were significantly and positively related to nonviolent protest. Regression of rebellion in the 1980s on mobilization for rebellion, grievances, and competitiveness of participation revealed that mobilization was significantly and positively related and competitiveness was significantly and negatively related to rebellion. Grievances were insignificant in both cases. Both of these findings supported the significance of early postindependence democracy, whereas the effects of democracy and competitiveness of participation in the 1970s were insignificant when entered into the same equations. The replication with Phase III data (see Table 1 ) strongly confirmed these relationships, although the relationship between mobilization for protest and nonviolent protest barely missed being significant, and the percentage of the variance explained declined, probably due to the inclusion of violent protest from 1980 to 1989. Appendix B contains descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study.
THE EFFECTS OF PROTEST AND REBELLION ON GROUP PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN THE 1990s
Because the positive relationship between democracy in the early 1960s and nonviolent protest in the 1980s and the negative relationship between competitiveness of participation in the early 1960s and rebellion in the 1980s have been strongly replicated with MAR Phase III and Polity III data, it might be assumed that a pattern of nonviolent protest, associated with longstanding relative democracy, may have facilitated the democratic transitions that occurred in the early 1990s, whereas a pattern of rebellion, associated with long-standing absence of competitive participation, may have had the opposite effect. There is relatively little overlap between Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) primarily student and worker protests and the ethnic protest intensity coded by MAR (Scarritt & McMillan, 2000) , so it should be interesting to compare the effects of both types of protest.
Our hypotheses about the effects of nonviolent protest and rebellion by ethnopolitical groups on democratic transitions and the resulting level of democracy can be tested by relating patterns of nonviolent protest and rebellion in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, taken from the MAR Phase I and Phase III data sets, to either the degree of transition, taken from Bratton and van de Walle (1997), or a measure of level of democracy in the 1994 that Bratton and van de Walle (pp. 286-287) take from Freedom House (1995).
2 Bratton and van de Walle distinguish among precluded transitions, blocked transitions, flawed transitions, and successful democratic transitions (pp. 119-122), creating a 4-point scale of transition. In 1995, Tanzania met their conditions for a successful transition, so we shifted it to that category, thus extending the transitions data through the end of that year. Niger has had a coup, but it nevertheless made a successful transition as defined by Bratton and van de Walle. "Continuous democracies" are excluded from their analysis and thus from most of ours. Analysts using Polity III usually work with net democracy (democracy minus autocracy, because these are scored as separate variables) rather than the straight democracy variable that we employed in our previous analysis. This distinction is more important in Africa for the 1990s than it was for previous decades because key aspects of democratic transitions have been coded in Polity III as reductions in autocracy or change to an ambiguous status with regard to net democracy rather than increases in democracy, so significant change does not appear to have occurred. Because we are interested in explaining the success of transitions rather than only their outcomes and we want to integrate our analysis with that of Bratton and van de Walle, we do not employ Polity III data in this phase of our analysis.
Because the cases in the MAR data set are ethnopolitical groups, we first test the relationship between group political action and presence in countries with varying levels of democratic transition and posttransition democracy at the group level; we then aggregate MAR data to the country level to examine the relationship between aggregate protest and rebellion by minorities at risk and transitions as well as levels of democracy in 1994 at the country level. At Mobilization, Grievances, and Democratic Traits, 1960-1964 the group level, the major questions of interest to us are whether groups that had engaged in higher levels of protest were more likely to be in countries that were to experience democratic transitions (vs. authoritarian countries that would not experience transitions) and/or higher (vs. lower) levels of democracy in 1994, whereas groups that had engaged in higher levels of rebellion were less likely to be in such countries.
As can be seen from Table 2 , with protest held constant, both rebellion from 1960 to 1990 and rebellion in the 1980s (REB6090 and REBEL80s, respectively) significantly decrease the chance of a group being in a country that was to undergo a more complete democratic transition as defined by Bratton and van de Walle (in comparison to its chance of being in a country that would not undergo such a transition), whereas protest in the same time periods (PROT6090 and PROT80s) significantly increases that chance with rebellion held constant. These findings hold for groups in both phases of MAR and in bivariate relationships not reported here. Whereas Bratton and van de Walle focus on the positive role of student and worker protest immediately prior to transition, our findings suggest that a somewhat longer (1980s) or very long history of a specific type of protest-rebellion by minorities at risk-hinders democratic transitions, whereas the same histories of another specific type-primarily nonviolent protest by minorities at risk-has positive consequences.
This finding is reinforced by the relationships between protest in both time periods and groups' presence in countries with different levels of democracy in 1994, as indicated in Table 2 (noting that level of democracy, taken from Freedom House, 1995, is scored with lower numbers indicating greater democracy). Groups engaged in medium-or long-term protest are also more likely to be in countries with a higher level of democracy in 1994. The results for rebellion are in the right direction, but most are insignificant. We recognize that the percentage of the variance explained is low in Table 2 because we omit some (unknown) explanatory variables, but these tables report group-level analyses, and we suspect that the missing explanatory variables are country-level ones.
3 It should be noted that in Table 2, unlike Tables 1 and  4 , prior democracy is not included as an independent variable because almost no independent variables are significant when it is included. Prior democracy is significant in determining levels of ethnopolitical protest and rebellion, but they in turn affect transitions independently of it. We believe that our group level findings-especially those regarding transition-are strong and generally consistent with our previous analysis, thus providing another valuable piece in our democracy and ethnopolitics puzzle. To complete this puzzle, we must now move to country-level analysis for a more appropriate and powerful explanation of the relation between ethnopolitical action and both democratic transition and level of democracy in 1994.
THE EFFECTS OF PROTEST AND REBELLION ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND THE LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s
At the country level, one question is whether the presence of minorities at risk in a country affects the probability that it has undergone a democratic transition. Does the existence of political action by such minorities, whatever its form, promote democratization in comparison to the absence of such 810 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / September 2001 Note: Prot80s = MAR protest, 1980 -1989 Rebel80s = MAR rebellion, 1980 -1989 Riot80s = MAR riot, 1980 -1989 Prot6090 = MAR protest, 1960 -1990 Reb6090 = MAR rebellion, 1960 -1990 . Ordinary least squares standardized coefficients are reported. a. 1960 to 1989 for Phase I data. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
political action, or is the presence of minorities at risk more of an impediment to democratization than their absence? Table 3a demonstrates that there are sharp differences between countries with and without minorities at risk (at any time since independence) regarding the likelihood of democratic transition between 1990 and 1995. None of the 15 countries with authoritarian regimes and no minorities at risk had a precluded, blocked, or incomplete transition as defined by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) , whereas almost half (13 out of 27) of the countries with authoritarian regimes and minorities at risk had such very partial or nonexistent transitions. Tau-c is highly significant for this difference. Furthermore, a slightly higher proportion of countries without minorities at risk than countries with some of them had full rather than flawed transitions. Although the group-level analysis of minorities at risk shows that (mostly nonviolent) protest has a positive effect on minorities in countries with more successful democratic transitions, at the country level, where countries without such minorities can be included in the analysis, not having any ethnopolitical minorities at risk has an even more positive effect. The relationship between this finding and the country-level effects of the level of ethnopolitical protest and rebellion on transitions is discussed below. One of the primary justifications given by both one-party and military authoritarians in the 1960s and 1970s for reducing the level of democracy in their countries was that greater authoritarianism would dampen the intensity of ethnopolitical conflict. It is easy to imagine that leaders of countries with the high level of such conflict represented by one or more minorities at risk-especially those that had engaged in rebellionwould resist redemocratization most strongly.
To facilitate statistical analysis, we group levels of democracy in 1994 in Table 3b into the three more general levels that have been used by Freedom House (free, partially free, and not free). The table, which includes five socalled continuous democracies, shows that having no minorities at risk also enhances the level of democracy to a statistically significant degree. The same logic that led authoritarian rulers of countries with minorities at risk to resist transitions more intensely apparently leads posttransition leaders (often the same people) to be less democratic because they fear the reintensification of ethnopolitical conflict or to rationalize their continued authoritarian practices in these terms. Of course, authoritarian leaders who blocked transitions remain authoritarian.
Complete explanations of the differences between countries with and without minorities at risk and the great variations among countries with minorities at risk with regard to both transition and democracy in 1994 (Tables 3a and 3b ) require looking in greater detail at various cases. Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, and South Africa stand out as the countries with Note: tau-c = -.4898 (p = .0001). Note: tau-c = .3730 (p = .0066).
minorities at risk that have most fully sustained democratic transitions. Madagascar's minority at risk-the Merina-was formerly politically advantaged but has not played a crucial role in that country's transition, and democratization has put greater emphasis on conflicts among their coastal opponents (Allen, 1995, pp. 100-117) . In Mali, the ongoing Tuareg rebellion was confined to this small and peripheral minority and did not disturb the transition process. 4 In Namibia, minorities at risk were quite small and engaged in relatively little protest and no rebellion. In these countries, the institutional and short-term nonethnic protest variables used by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and, for the case of Mali, Vengroff (1993) to explain transitions easily overcame any resistance caused by the presence of minorities at risk. South Africa is a very different and special case in which transition was successful and the resultant level of democracy high in spite of the entire population being at risk, all groups engaging in extensive protest, and Africans engaging in a high level of rebellion. The South African transition was the closest in Africa to a pacted transition, in which a negotiated settlement resolved intense ethnopolitical conflict because political parties representing all groups saw that, at least for that moment, compromise was more in their interests than continued conflict (Sisk, 1995) .
The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Niger, and Zambia had successful transitions but failed in varying degrees to maintain high levels of democracy. Niger, which has had a much longer history of rebellion by a minority at risk than the other two countries, has been under military rule since the 1996 coup, which was motivated in part by the civilian government's inability to put down the rebellion (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 245) . The elected Congolese president has been overthrown in a civil war in which the nonviolent minority identified as at risk (the Lari) has been a major player and in which other ethnopolitical conflict has been the dominant factor. Zambia, in which the majority of the population was identified as belonging to minorities at risk in Phase I but where rebellion has been very rare, has experienced the disqualification in the second posttransition election of a major opposition candidate (former president Kenneth Kaunda), who had majority support from his ethnopolitical group in the first posttransition election. This and a number of other irregularities in democratic procedures have been caused by the ruling party's fear of fragmenting along ethnopolitical lines. Finally, in Ghana, a flawed transition initially produced a flawed democracy, but ensuing ethnopolitical accommodation set the stage for a highly successful sec-ond election in 1996, contributing to an increase in the level of democracy. The Ewe, one of the minorities at risk, has supported the predemocratic incumbent president, who won both the transitional and the first posttransition elections and is from that group. The Ashanti, the largest minority at risk, is the principal electoral base for his opposition. However, because of their large size, both groups have also been multiethnic coalition partners in previous regimes, which has facilitated democracy-sustaining accommodation. The third minority at risk has recently experienced considerable violence among subgroups, but its regional concentration means that this has had no significant impact on democratization.
Minorities at risk are found in a much higher percentage of the countries that have had unsuccessful transitions, low levels of democracy in 1994, or both. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritania, and Togo have had flawed transitions resulting in low levels of posttransition democracy. The tiny but wealthy Lebanese minority in Cote d'Ivoire has not played a major role in that country's problems with democratization, but minorities at risk have been central to these problems in all of the other countries in this category. In Cameroon, two related minorities at risk (Bamileke and Westerners) form the core of support for the opposition to the pretransition president maintained in power through questionable elections. In Djibouti, rivalry between the Issa majority and the Afar minority weakened civil society, delayed transition, and led to posttransition rebellion. Kenya is another country in which a majority of the population is composed of minorities at risk. Although there has been limited rebellion by the Somali, Kenya's transition has been flawed primarily because of intense ethnopolitical competition among the larger groups in the country. Pretransition and posttransition president Daniel arap Moi has consistently claimed that democratization will exacerbate this competition and has taken measures to guarantee that his prophecy would be self-fulfilling (Throup & Hornsby, 1998) . In Mauritania, the Moorish majority has long persecuted the Black African minority, and more recently, tensions have increased between so-called White and Black Moors. These conflicts led the regime to carry out a managed but flawed transition and to continue violating human rights, including the arrest of opposition leaders. Finally, in Togo, the northern (Kabre)-dominated military regime restricted the power of the national conference, shot protestors, and rigged elections out of fear of losing power to their long-time southern (Ewe) rival minority at risk, leading to an opposition boycott of the legislature.
Uganda is unique in having a blocked transition and a medium level of subsequent democracy. A majority of the population in this country was classified as belonging to minorities at risk in Phase I, and there has been extensive rebellion. The current leader seized power through rebellion and has declared that no-party democracy is the only way for Uganda to democratize without rekindling the ethnopolitical conflicts that accompanied multiparty politics (and military rule) in the past. Observers see important nondemocratic elements in this system (Kasfir, 1998) .
Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan are the African countries with minorities at risk that have not had transitions and consequently have low levels of democracy. It is striking that 11 of these 12 countries have experienced rebellions by minorities at risk (in most cases, high levels of such rebellion, as will be discussed below), and Liberia has experienced extensive rebellion by other groups. Most of these rebellions have received wide attention in the world press and need not be described here. In Guinea, rebellion (by the Malinke) has been a minor factor in blocking transition. Guinea's transition was delayed and essentially blocked by a formally civilian but formerly military ruler who would not hold a free and fair election. Although Nigeria has now had a successful transition, its 1993 transition was blocked by a formally military ruler who canceled the counting of votes when his favorite candidate appeared to have lost a free and fair election, but in this case, the long history of widespread and often intense ethnopolitical conflict (including the Biafran rebellion of 1967-1970) played a significant role in the decision to block a democratic transition. Different but related country-level questions are whether higher levels of ethnopolitical protest and/or rebellion facilitate or hinder democratic transitions and higher levels of democracy following them. These are not the country-level equivalents of the questions that we asked at the group level because of the inclusion of countries without minorities at risk. Because cases in the Minorities at Risk project are ethnopolitical groups rather than countries, we must aggregate MAR variables to the country level to answer these questions. This can be done for each country in several logically and theoretically justifiable ways. In a previous analysis (Scarritt & McMillan, 2000) we tried all of these ways for protest and found that two produced the strongest relationships: total protest and rebellion by ethnopolitical groups in a country, or total protest and rebellion weighted by the proportion of a country's population that is at risk, which we call MARPROT and MARAVG, respectively. We also think that these two forms of aggregation are more theoretically relevant than the others. In the brief case studies above, we have shown that regimes (pre-, post-, or without transition) in countries with minorities at risk fear ethnopolitical action. Total political action by such minorities is the best indicator of the level of this fear. In the present analysis, we use MARPROT and the parallel variable MARREB because they produce relationships that are slightly stronger than but very similar to those produced by their weighted counterparts. These variables are scored as indicated in Appendix A.
It is clear from the number of previously highly authoritarian countries that appear in the right-hand columns of Tables 3a and 3b that a relatively high level of prior democracy is not a requisite for either successful transition or a relatively high level of posttransition democracy. Several countries, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Mozambique, whose histories included little prior democracy, experienced successful transitions. Nevertheless, we include the level of prior democracy or other variables designed to measure aspects of it in our regressions because they improve the percentage of the variance explained and, more important, because of our interest in the interaction between ethnopolitical action and democracy.
In Table 4 , we report MARPROT and MARREB for three different time periods, all of which are relevant to our analysis. The 1988-1992 time period, included here because it was also used in Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) analysis of protest and democratic transitions and in our earlier analysis of ethnopolitical action and human rights, immediately preceded these transitions (or actually overlapped slightly with them in time); the 1980s is the medium time period during which ethnopolitical action might influence democratization, and 1960-1990 represents the entire postindependence era and is essentially the period during which minorities at risk could exist (reflected in Tables 3a and 3b ) and act politically. Although our previous analysis and its replications in this article use democracy in the 1960s as an independent variable, we found that democracy in the 1970s was more significant as an explanatory variable for democratic transitions. An examination of the Polity data reveals that different African countries were the most democratic in each of these decades. Those that became independent with the highest levels of multiparty competition remained most democratic, on the average, for the first half of that decade, to which DEMOC60 and PRCOMP60 apply. By the 1970s, the period we use for prior democracy in Table 4 , a majority of the most democratic countries had competitive oneparty regimes.
When included in equations along with democracy in the 1970s, which has positive but insignificant effects, and MARPROT, which has insignificant negative effects, MARREB in all three periods has significant negative effects on democratic transition. Although transition is a matter of degree and thus not a dichotomous variable for Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and for us, we tried a logit analysis that separated full transitions from all other categories, and it reproduced the same strong negative relationship. It is not surprising that violent ethnopolitical rebellions in the decade leading up to dem-ocratic transitions are not conducive to transition success; to understand the strength of the negative effect of rebellions over the preceding 30 years, it must be remembered that most of these have continued through the 1980s because neither the rebels nor the state could achieve victory. The highest levels of rebellion in the 30-year period (in states that existed for the entire period) were experienced by Ethiopia, Uganda, Angola, Sudan, Chad, Zaire, Somalia, Nigeria, Burundi, South Africa, and Rwanda, in that order; the highest levels of rebellion in the 1980s were experienced by virtually the Note: Democ70s = Average democracy, 1970s. MAR Prot = MAR protest; MAR Reb = MAR rebellion; 8892 = 1988-1992; 8089 = 1980-1989; 6090 = 1960-1990 . Ordinary least squares standardized coefficients are reported. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. same countries in a slightly different order. These 11 countries account for more than 90% of the total rebellion score from 1960 to 1989 and 28 out of 43 minorities at risk in these countries (65.1%) engaged in rebellion. As indicated in Table 3a , these countries include 10 of the 13 with precluded or blocked transitions (and the other three also experienced some rebellion, as discussed above), whereas only in the unusual case of South Africa was there a high level of rebellion and a successful and sustained transition. Rebellion by minorities at risk significantly inhibits transitions in both the group-and country-level analyses. Countries with the highest levels of protest are evenly divided between the two lower and the two higher transition levels. In regressions that include the same additional independent variables, MARREB has an insignificant, although still negative (because lower numbers in the Freedom House scale indicate greater democracy) effect on level of democracy in 1994. Once transition either occurs or fails, the influence of the level of prior rebellion is greatly reduced, although Table 3b demonstrates that most countries with the lowest level of democracy (not free) had some rebellion. The influence of prior democracy remains positive and insignificant, and MARPROT remains insignificant.
Whereas our group-level analysis has shown that among minorities at risk, those that engaged in protest were more likely to be in countries with higher levels of democracy in 1994, higher levels of protest in a country, aggregated across groups, have no significant effect on the level of 1994 democracy when compared to lower levels or no such protest. As in Table 2 , the percentage of the variance explained in these equations is small, and the constant is very large, indicating that we are not including the variables most strongly associated with transition or posttransition democracy. We tried without success to increase the explanatory power of the equations reported in Table 4 by adding a number of individual variables such as GNP, economic growth, and Bratton and van de Walle's protest variables. (When either of their protest variables for the same time period is entered into Equations 1 and 2 of Table 4 , the percentage of the variance explained declines, which shows that the two forms of protest are very different.) Bratton and van de Walle's already powerful equations for transition and level of democracy in 1994 include most of the variables that are important for explaining these phenomena but do not take into account the possibility that ethnopolitical action has an independent effect. Thus, a useful alternative way to examine the effects of the level of ethnopolitical action on democratization in multivariate relationships is to add MAR variables to these equations to see if explanatory power can be improved. This is done in Tables 5  and 6 with positive and interesting results. Tables 5a and 5b replicate Bratton and van de Walle's procedure of starting with a model of democratic transition that includes all variables significant in their bivariate relationships, along with DEMOC70, MARPROT, and MARREB (see Table 5a ) and eliminating those that are not significant in this model to produce a simplified model (see Table 5b ). It does not replicate their dependent variable, which is change in the level of Freedom House democracy scores (rather than degree of transition success), because that variable does not behave reliably.
5
In Table 5a , with transition success as the dependent variable, MARREB 1960-1989 is minimally significant, whereas the more short-term MARREB, MARPROT, and DEMOC70 are insignificant, and the percentage of the vari- 5. We found the same problem in our previous work relating various forms of protest activity to changes in levels of two forms of human rights protection (Scarritt & McMillan, 2000) , and we attributed it to the more complex causal process, involving positive and negative change as well as very different starting points that are not adequately captured by regression equations. We believe that the same problems characterize our present analysis and that Bratton and van de Walle (1997) may escape them because most of their variables are measured in the short term. Comparing the two variables, change in level of democracy scores vary substantially within transition categories, and the same change scores are found in as many as three categories; average change scores in the successful transition category differ the most from average scores in other categories, whereas differences among the other categories are much smaller.
ance explained is higher than in the similar Bratton and van de Walle model. Their protest variable, overseas development assistance, and one of their transition process variables-military intervention-remain significant, but the other transition process variable-opposition cohesion-becomes insignificant, whereas one of their prior democracy measures-percentage of legislative seats occupied by the ruling party in 1989-becomes highly significant. We think that democracy in the 1970s is not significant in their model because that model includes a form of protest that is both short term and positively related to transition; once the long-term ethnopolitical rebellion variable that is negatively related to transition is introduced, prior democracy again becomes significant, although in the form of recent party dominance (instead of a nonelected regime) rather than democracy in the more distant past as measured by the Polity data.
In Table 5b , including all significant variables from Table 5a , the percentage explained is lower than in 5a but remains quite respectable; a comparison with Bratton and van de Walle's reduced model is difficult to interpret because the variables are so different. 6 Once again, long-term MAR rebellion and short-term primarily student and worker protest are shown to have very different effects. The two variables are correlated at -.41, but variance inflation factors do not indicate a problem with multicollinearity. The relationship is probably causal: Long-term rebellion inhibits not only transitions themselves but also the short-term protests that so powerfully foster them. The latter are insignificant in this equation because they cannot overcome this inhibiting effect. Table 6 demonstrates that MARREB is less significant (< .10) and the increase in explanatory power that results from including it is less in relation to the level of democracy in 1994. Once again, Bratton and van de Walle's protest becomes insignificant when the MAR rebellion is included in the equation with other variables that are significant at the .10 level or better in the full model. Both of their prior democracy variables-percentage of legislative seats and number of elections-are significant (although the effect of the latter is puzzlingly negative because lower scores indicate greater democracy) with and without the inclusion of MAR variables. Although not as significant as transition process variables in determining whether transitions occur, prior democracy, along with ethnopolitical rebellion, is very significant in determining whether those transitions are sustained, even in the short run.
6. Only military intervention during the transition process is significant in both models. Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) protest variable, overseas development assistance, and opposition cohesion are the other independent variables that are significant in their model, and as discussed above, the two models employ different, although related, dependent variables. (1980s) with kindred groups, independence, and greater regional autonomy Democracy, Polity III 10-point scale of institutionalized democracy, averaged for 1960-1964; 1970s 1960-1964 or 1970-1979 
